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COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
RESEARCH AND LEASING POLICIES FOR THE
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OIL SHALE LANDS
GEORGE MIRON*

In the area of what is now northwestern Colorado, southwestern
Wyoming, and eastern Utah, about sixty million years ago when the
last dinosaurs were taking leave of the Earth, the Rocky Mountains
were upfolded and great basins between the mountains were formed.
These basins became broad, shallow lakes, slowly filling with sediments deposited by mountain streams charged by abundant rainfall.
The climate was warm and sunny. Algae and other organic life
abounded in the lakes and settled to the bottom finely interspersed
in the sediments. With time conditions changed, resulting in faster
sedimentation of coarser particles, so that ultimately the lakes were
filled with sands.' A few million years ago the lands were uplifted
to about their present altitudes. The thickest deposits, in which the
organic material was trapped in such profusion, now lie buried under
hundreds, and even thousands of feet of rock in the center of the
ancient basins. These beds are thickest and deepest in the center
of the former basins.'
The organisms decayed leaving the rock impregnated with a finely
divided solid matter called kerogen. The rock is called oil shale.
When the rock is crushed and destructively distilled at high temperatue, the kerogen is converted into a synthetic oil with essentially the
same general characteristics as those of many native crude oils.'
In some places the sediments are interspersed with large quantities
of carbonate minerals, including dawsonite, a sodium aluminum carbonate, and nahcolite, a sodium carbonate.
Together, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah contain about 11 mil0 Associate Solicitor, for Reclamation and Power, U.S. Department of the Interior.
The author hopes, but does not represent, that the views he has expressed herein are
shared by others.
1. Bradley, Origin and Microfossils of the Oil Shale of the Green River Formation
of Colorado and Utah, United States Geological Survey Professional Paper 168, at 54-56
(1931) ; Bradley, Limnology and the Eocene Lakes of the Rocky Mountain Region, 59
Bulletin of the Geological Society of America 635 (1948).
2. See generally, Donnell, Tertiary Geology and Oil-Shale Resources of the Piceance
Creek Basin Between the Colorado and White Rivers Northw'estern Colorado, 1961
United States Geological Survey Bulletin 1082-L. The geological map and cross-section
shown on Plate 48 of the pocket supplement vividly display the general geology of the
Piceance Creek oil shale area in Colorado.
3. Duncan and Swanson, Organic-Rich Shale of the United States and World Land
Areas, United States Geological Survey Circular No. 523, at 2-3 (1965).
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lion acres of land described by the United States Department of
Interior as oil shale lands. The deposits vary considerably in thickness and kerogen content. Private ownership by fee title or state
leases involves about 28 percent of the acreage with the rest of the
lands under federal ownership. 4 About 5,200,000 acres of the federal land in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah are subject to unpatented
mining claims, including many alleged to have been located prior to
the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.' About 1.5 million
acres of the federally owned lands are the subject of metalliferous
mining claims alleged to have been located in 1966 and early 1967.6
Shale lands may be classified by the estimated yield of oil per ton
of rock. Those Rocky Mountain oil shales, usually referred to as
part of the Green River Formation, which would yield 10 gallons
or more per ton, are estimated to contain about 7.4 trillion barrels
of oil equivalent. This is nearly 200 times the American Petroleum
Institute's estimate of 39.8 billion barrels of proved recoverable reserves of natural liquid hydrocarbons in the United States. The
higher grade shales, those yielding 25 gallons or more per ton, contain an oil equivalent of 0.6 trillion barrels, or about 15 times the
nation's proved recoverable reserves of natural liquid hydrocarbons. 7
One square mile of oil shale land in the center of the Piceance
Basin in Colorado, containing the thickest, richest, but the most
deeply buried of the evaluated reserves, has been estimated to contain about 1 billion barrels of oil, 40 million tons of alumina, and 80
million tons of soda ash.' This alumina, if recoverable, would represent about seven times the nation's annual production of about 5.9
million tons in 1965.' The soda ash, if recoverable, would represent
about 13 times the nation's annual production of about 6.4 million
tons in 1965. l0
Lest the reader count his blessings too hastily, let him note that
the first commercial oil shale mine has yet to be dug, the first commercial retort has yet to be built, and recovery processes for alumina
or soda ash from oil shale have yet to be proved, even though in
4. Hearings on Competitive Aspects of Oil Shale Development Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Con., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 75-77 (1967). [Hereinafter cited as Antitrust Hearings]; United States Dep't of
the Interior, Report on the Prospects for Oil Shale Development - Colorado, Utah and
Wyoming, Table A-1 (May, 1968). [Hereinafter cited as Interior Oil Shale Report]
5. InteriorOil Shale Report, supra note 4, at Table A-3.
6. Id. For a discussion of problems these metalliferous claims raise under the mineral
laws, consult The "Associated Minerals" Dilemma and the New Federal Oil Shale Policy,
39 Colo. L. Rev. 370 (1967).
7. Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at 74-75.
8. Id. at 75-76.
9. United States Department of the Interior, 1 Minerals Yearbook 223 (1965).
10. Id. Table I, at 856.
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Colorado alone some 250,000 acres of oil shale lands are held by
about 20 oil companies. The shale deposits on these lands generally
occur at or near the surface, in fairly thick beds which would yield
25 or more gallons of synthetic crude oil per ton of rock." Thus
kerogen and minerals contained in the buried rock are not necessarily
wealth in the economy or money in the Treasury.
In view of the prospect that the public oil shale lands hold wealth
of a staggering magnitude, it is not surprising that the subject has
generated a debate as to whether the market place can be relied
upon to allocate the public oil shale resources properly. Some members of Congress, 2 Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, 3 and
the Governors of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah 4 have proposed
that private enterprise be permitted to lease the public oil shale
lands. Some other members of Congress have sponsored bills to preclude leasing until a federal research and development program is
completed, and the United States has built and made operative a
full-scale mining and processing facility or facilities. 5 There are
also proposals that the Government sponsor research at the same
16
time that it is leasing oil shale land to private parties.
The proposals for government research and development ventures, including the government operation of oil shale production
11. Antitrust Hearings,supra note 4, map foldout facing 178.
12. Id. at 263-76 (testimony of Senator Gordon Allot, Colo.) ; Id. at 215-17 (testimony
of Senator Wallace Bennett, Utah) ; 113 Cong. Rec. S. 9411-14 (daily ed. July 11, 1967)
(remarks of Senator Phillip Hart, Mich.) ; address by Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall,
Colo., PoliticalAspects of an Emerging Oil Shale Industry, before the Society of Petroleum
Engineers of the A.I.M.E. New York City, Feb. 28, 1966.
13. United States Dep't. of the Interior News Release, Proposed Regulations to
Govern Oil Shale Leasing and Land Exchanges Announced May 7, 1967, reprinted in
Hearings on the Federal Oil Shale Program Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 130-131 (1967). [Hereinafter cited as Interior
Hearings]; Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 128-33. The Report recommends
the offerings of two test leases, each for a sufficient acreage of resource to satisfy a 35,000
to 50,000 barrel-per-day plant, for the period to amortize the investment, which is estimated to be from 20 to 30 years. One lease would be in the area of thick, deep shale beds
of the Piceance Basin; the other in an area of thin beds amenable to conventional mining
and retorting techniques.
14. Letter from Governor John A. Love, Colo., Governor Calvin L. Rampton, Utah,
and Governor Stanley Hathaway, Wyo., to Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall
(Oil Shale Program) undated, received by the Dep't. of the Interior August 10, 1967,
reprinted in InteriorHearings at 143-48.
15. S. 2754, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Introduced by Senator Proxmire, Wisc., for
himself, and Senators Morse, Ore., Tydings, Md., Clark, Pa., Metcalf, Mont., and Young,
Ohio. 113 Cong. Rec. S. 18169 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1967) ; H.R. 14562, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). Introduced by Congressman William F. Ryan, N.Y., 113 Cong. Rec. H. 17208
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1967).
16. See, e.g., Dep't. of the Interior News Release, Five-Point Oil Shale Development
Program Announced Jan. 27, 1967 reprinted in Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at
489-91; Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 123-25.
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facilities, are based on the view that until additional technology is
developed the market place cannot be relied upon to allocate the
public oil shale resources properly. The fear has been expressed
that unless a technology is developed and made available to all
competitors before the land is leased, (a) the resource will be
monopolized by a handful of companies which possess the critical
technology, and (b) the public oil shale lands will have been alienated at a small fraction of their potential value. 7
This article seeks to make the case (1) that government-sponsored research is not inconsistent with the functioning of a competitive system, and (2) that when the public oil shale resources are
disposed of to private parties, competitive leasing is the best method
to prevent a monopoly of technology, to allocate the public oil shale
resources properly, and to protect the revenue interests of the
United States.
I
THE EFFECTS ON COMPETITION OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
RESEARCH
Oil has not yet been produced from oil shale in the United States
except on a research basis. Opinions vary as to whether with present
technology commercial production of oil shale would be profitable
now. 18 It is not possible to conclude with any assurance that critical
technology would be readily accessible to all competitors seeking
to develop public oil shale lands. The absence of this assurance has
caused concern that if the technology were tightly held, the opening
of the public lands would result in an expansion of a technology
monopoly into a resource monopoly. Secretary of the Interior Udall
expressed this concern during his testimony before the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, on September 14,
1967, when he stated :'"
17. See, e.g., 113 Cong. Rec. S. 18169 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1967) (remarks of Senator
Proxmire) ; Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 125-26.
18. Among those asserting that adequate technology now exists for economic mining
and processing of oil shale are Walter Mead, Professor of Economics, University of
California, Santa Barbara, California, Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at 378, and
Morton Winston, vice president of The Oil Shale Corporation, Antitrust Hearings,supra
note 4, at 308. Those who have expressed doubt as to the existence of an adequate technology include Professor Morris Garnsey, Department of Economics, University of
Colorado, Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at 41, and Secretary of the Interior Udall,
Interior Hearings, supra note 13, at 176-77. A concise review of the state of the art is
given by Wade Watkins, Director of Petroleum Research, United States Bureau of
Mines, in Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at 87-104. A more recent review is given in
Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, ch. 4 at 40-79.
19. Interior Hearings, supra note 13, at 182.
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But we did not feel that we could make the resource available for the
purpose of developing the technology without guaranteeing that the
technology would be available to develop the resource over the longterm future.

The Department of the Interior has also expressed concern that
the alienation of the public resource before an adequate technology
is available could result in inadequate compensation to the public.
The Department's recent report on oil shale prospects states :20
This study indicates that the value of the resource in place now is
small, and will remain so until new technology has been developed and
proved. Industry, if it purchases the resource subject to the development of improved technology in the future, probably would discount

its bid at the rates it uses for alternative delayed return investment
opportunities. Since this could reduce the bonus bids, the Government should alienate little of its holdings until improved technology
is developed or shown to be available by bids of appropriate size.
The Department of the Interior has proposed government expenditures on research as one method for reducing the hazard that
a monopoly of technology will result in a monopoly of production
21
from public lands.
In considering the effect of government-sponsored research on
the functioning of competition, one aspect of the question must be
emphasized. The United States, acting through the Secretary of the
Interior, holds the public lands in trust for the people of the country.22 Some research expenditures may offer prospects for enhancing
the value of the government's holdings. They may represent investments which any reasonable landlord would consider prudent and
any reasonable trustee would consider obligatory. Included in this
20. Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 126.
21. The research spending features of Secretary Udall's Five-Point Oil Shale Program announced January 27, 1967, are points four and five. Point four would involve
joint research with industry in the use of nuclear explosives to fracture oil shale to permit
retorting in situ. Point five contemplated a total expenditure of 100 million dollars over
10 years for research in oil shale technology, economics and geology, and into means of
protecting the environment. InteriorHearings,supra note 13, at 177. Also consult Interior
Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 123 and 124-25. The Dep't. of the Interior had also
proposed the use of research and development leases to develop additional technology.
43 C.F.R. sec. 3170-72 (1968). This proposal is discussed in text accompanying note 43,
infra.
22. "The Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public
lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to see that the law is carried out,
and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a party not entitled to
it." Knight v. U.S. Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891). See also Cameron v.
United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1920).

OCTOBER

1968]

ROCKY MOUNTAIN LANDS

category would be government investment which tended to enhance
the land values by developing and disseminating technology which
would make shale oil production profitable. Where such investments
would ordinarily be made by the landlord, whether private or public, they reflect the market place at work, rather than an interference with it.
At the same time, some kinds of government research and development expenditures to enhance its land values might displace
private efforts and dull the cutting edge of competition by subsidizing those Who would not do research on their own. Thus, while it
is unreasonable to expect the Government to forego research investments which any prudent entrepreneur might make to enhance the
value of his lands, solely because the investments would incidentally
subsidize less aggressive competitors, it is equally unreasonable for
the Government to invest in research ventures which would subsidize
the inert, while offering little or no promise of enhancing its land
values.
Tested by this standard the proposal for government construction and operation of a full-scale commercial oil shale mining
and retorting facility as a device to develop new technology raises
several questions. In analyzing the problem, let us assume that the
government plant will be for research and demonstration purposes
only, and the Government will not continue to market its products
when the research effort is completed. Such investment might be for
research into the mining of thick, deeply buried deposits by nuclear
fracturing, or by open pit or cut-and-fill methods, or for the retorting of such deposits in place. The venture would tend to benefit
government land chiefly because the Government holds large amounts
of such oil shale lands and private parties hold much less. Investment of this character would therefore not tend to interfere with
competition.
If the investment were made in a demonstration plant to improve technology useful on the type of deposits which are held in
abundance by private parties as well as by the Government, it is
more difficult to justify the government effort, because the degree
of subsidy to private parties would be magnified, and the intensity of
private efforts might be lessened. As a result, the opportunities for
3
innovation offered by a diversity of efforts would be undermined.1
Nonetheless, this kind of demonstration plant would be justifiable if
23. The case for a diversity of efforts is made in J. Jewkes, D. Sawers and R. Stillerman, The Sources of Invention (1958). Consult especially, the discussion of monopoly
and development, ch. VII, at 212-22.
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there were reason to believe that private efforts would not be displaced.
In this regard the present tax treatment of oil shale is relevant.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the percentage depletion allowance rate on oil shale is 15 percent,2 4 to be applied to the
gross income from the mined rock.25 The percentage depletion allowance rate on crude oil is 272 percent. 26 In each case the maximum depletion allowance permitted is 50 percent of net income from
27
the property.
At the 15 percent rate, and with the 50 percent net income ceiling
a barrel of semi-refined shale oil worth $3.69 delivered at a Midwest refinery (assuming by-product credits) would have a depletion
allowance worth about 5 cents after taxes on the gross income attributable to the mined rock.2 8 If the rate were 27Y2 percent, and
applied to the retorted oil, the allowance would be worth about 40
cents per barrel after taxes.2 9
It is not surprising that there have been efforts to change the depletion treatment of oil shale." Such efforts could be nullified by
a demonstration that oil shale production was profitable under existing tax treatment. It is therefore not unthinkable that there is a
business incentive in delaying investment in oil shale in the hope of
demonstrating a need for more favorable tax treatment. On the
other hand, investment in oil shale has yet to be proved to be an
economic alternative to investment in other hydrocarbon energy
sources, and the absence of greater investment may reflect only a
judgment by entrepreneurs to prefer safer investments.
Even if the latter were true, however, it does not follow that a
research plant investment by the Government would be imprudent
because the same investment would have been an imprudent one by
a. private landowner. The decision in each case would involve a
judgment as to whether the estimated risk-discounted value returned will exceed the cost. The risk discount will be the same
24. Rev. Rul. 57-529, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 325.
25. Private rulings, in the 1950's and early 1960's; Letter from T. Coleman Andrews,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, to Senator Eugene Milliken, Colo., May 16,
1955.
26. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613 (b).
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613 (a).
28. Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 109.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., S. 1068, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; H.R. 395, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), to amend sec. 613 (c) (4) (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68 Stat. 210
(1954), as amended, 74 Stat. 293 (1960), 26 U.S.C. sec. 613 (c) (4) (e) ; Testimony of
Morton Winston of The Oil Shale Corp., Antitrust Hearings,supra note 4, at 339-40.
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whether the investment is private or public, but a government investment would cost less because of lower interest costs, and the
potential return in land value enhancement may be greater for the
Government because it owns so much more oil shale land than any
private party. Thus even if the lack of private investment reflected
only a negative judgment on the economic potential of oil shale,
the government investment might be prudent. That being the case,
if there is reason to believe that private efforts will not be forthcoming, a government demonstration plant, looking toward enhancing government land values, may be justifiable even if the techniques investigated would also benefit private landowners.
It should be noted that the justification for a government demonstration plant does not require that the Government operate plants
other than for research purposes, i.e., to market the products after
the research is completed. Such government operations would have
these characteristics:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Lower interest costs than private enterprise;
No land acquisition costs;
No state property, income, or severance tax costs, and no federal tax costs;
(4) No necessity of operating at a profit rate comparable to the
rate at which private parties must operate.
It is most unlikely that private parties will rush to the Land Office
for leases so that they can do battle against that kind of competition. The presence of the Government as a competitor is therefore
likely to deter other entrants and depress, rather than enhance, the
value of other government shale lands. At the start, therefore, it
should be made clear that the government facility will not operate
to market shale oil after its research mission has been fulfilled.
In sum, it must be recognized that the Government should not be
denied opportunities for enhancing its land values through research
expenditures which any prudent landlord would make. Such expenditures might require a delay in the leasing of land to private parties
with the expectation that any loss in revenues during the research
interim will be more than compensated for in increased resource
values resulting from the research. At the same time it should be
recognized that government research efforts would not preclude private parties from engaging in research on their own lands.
We can now turn to the question of how the lands should be made
available to private parties.
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II
THE DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC OIL SHALE RESOURCES TO PRIVATE
PARTIES

At the outset it is necessary to consider whether imperfections in
the market place make competitive leasing unworkable. One possibility is that a few large companies would monopolize the bidding because they would be the most efficient operators. However, there is
no evidence to suggest that a shale mine and retort of optimum size
will be more efficiently operated if owned by a large company. In any
event the most efficient should be permitted to benefit from their
efficiency.
A more serious problem is the possibility that because a shale
plant might cost 138 million dollars or more 3l only the largest companies could muster the capital. The problem of capital barriers to
entry has been described as follows :32
What we generally do know is simply (1)

that the most-favored

established firms generally did have and now have access to internal
financing or to the capital markets at relatively favorable terms;
(2) that entrants would need to raise various large amounts of money

to finance entry; and (3) that as the capital requirement for entry
becomes larger raising money is thought to become "more difficult,"
presumably in the sense that either the effective interest cost is greater,
or "rationing" of funds limits more and more severely the roster of
potenial entrants, or both. In addition, on the postulate that established firms enjoy a generally preferred position and have not encountered diseconomies of accumulating large amounts of funds, it
is frequently thought that entrants are generally at some basic disadvantage in capital costs, and that this disadvantage increases with the
increase in the capital requirement. This would imply that, among
industries, the barrier to entry imposed by capital requirements is
higher as the capital requirement is higher, and also that there is
probably some tendency within any industry toward capital-cost diseconomies of increasing scale to the entrant.

In addition to the capital barriers, there is some reason to be concerned that vertical integration would inhibit entry of non-integrated
firms into the oil shale business as a result of the operation of the
tax laws. A recent report of the Attorney General indicates that the
special tax treatment for crude petroleum production tends to encourage integrated firms to favor their own crude oil, or bartered31. Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note +, Table 3 at 53; See also United States
Bureau of Mines, A Cost Evaluation of an Oil Shale Plant Circa 1966, at 49 (1967).
32. J. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Their Character and Consequences in
Manufacturing Industries 46 (1956).
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for crude oil, over crude oil purchased in the open market. The
report states :3
Despite these added costs, however, integration has one possible advantage peculiar to the oil industry. In orthodox economics, an integrated firm must ordinarily judge its total performance in terms of its
over-all investment and cost of operations as against the total returns
received. Transfer prices at intermediate levels are established only
for accounting purposes. Ordinarily these transfer prices parallel the

market price at that stage of processing, in order to show the relative
value of further processing steps as against the price which could be
realized on sale at that level. Unrealistic transfer pricing would be
simply accounting self-deception. But, in any event, these intermediate internal prices are irrelevant in judging the over-all profitability
of the corporation.
In oil, however, a producing-refining-marketing firm has a considerable incentive to establish transfer prices so adjusted as to place the
bulk of profit at the producing level. In contrast to other levels, the
special tax incentives to production, aimed at increasing the resource
base, make possible at that level a substantially greater proportion of
after-tax yield for each dollar of profit earned.
This suggests that a non-integrated refiner can compete effectively
with the integrated firm only if it can purchase crude oil at a price
discounted by the amount of saving which the tax law provides the
integrated refiner. To state it otherwise, the non-integrated producer of crude oil can expect to realize less from the sale of his
product.
Whether the same condition would exist with respect to shale oil
depends on the degree of benefit which the depletion allowance on
shale oil might confer.
As stated above, the depletion rate on oil shale is 15 percent of
the gross income from the mined rock, not to exceed 50 percent of
net income. On the basis of the data referred to above, depletion
allowance on the gross income attributable to the mined rock would
be worth about 10 cents before taxes or 5 cents after taxes. (A gross
income per barrel of $1.23 is attributed to the mined rock.) 4
Assuming that integrated producers were able to maintain a
posted price 20 percent higher than the real price of $1.23 attributable per barrel, the maximum base for depletion would be $1.478
per barrel. At 15 percent the maximum depletion which then might
be allowed would be worth about 22 cents before taxes or about 12
33. United States Department of Justice, Report of the Attorney General Pursuant to
Section 2 of the Joint Resolution of September 6, 1963, Consenting to an Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, 77-78 (July 1967).
34. This figure, upon which the S cents per barrel after tax worth of depletion allowance was based, in Interior Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 109, was supplied to
the author of this article by the Bureau of Mines.
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cents per barrel more than on the basis of the real price. This is the
potential cost advantage which would result under the depletion
rate from integration of mining and retorting, assuming a 20 percent difference between real prices and posted prices were accepted
for depletion purposes.
It is doubtful, however, whether this difference could be maintained. Mined shale would have low value in relation to its volume
and weight. It will probably be retorted quite close to the mine
mouth. It is therefore doubtful whether an active cash purchase
market will develop, and it is questionable whether sales will be accepted by the Internal Revenue Service as evidencing the real price.
Thus there is reason to doubt an ability to establish a substantially
higher basis for depletion than the real price. In addition, any tax
benefits of integration would be equally available to all who mined
and retorted. Since the close association of mining and retorting
suggests there will ordinarily be common ownership of both, it is
likely that all or most shale oil producers will get any such benefit.
Nonetheless, it has to be recognized that existing tax law might result in some added benefit to vertical integration, and if the depletion rate were applied to the shale oil and the rate were increased,
an advantage of integration into refining might be created. However, if high capital requirements and the operation of the tax laws
would tend to arm the larger firms with bidding advantages, this
would not dictate a departure from competitive bidding for these
reasons:
First, assuming capital barriers and vertical integration gave the
major companies a substantial biddng advantage at lease sales, the
consequences would be that the first 20 or so leases would be taken
up by that number of integrated oil companies and possibly by large
petrochemical companies. 35 While this may not approximate the
model of perfect competition, it is far from monopoly. The rivalry
between that many firms selling the same product from the same
geographic locale could provide heavy competitive pressures.
Second, any tax advantage of integration with respect to shale oil
would be much less acute than with respect to crude petroleum; yet
competitive leasing of federal oil and gas lands is widely practiced."6
35. The 20 largest petroleum companies, as of 1966, are listed in Antitrust Hearings,
supra note 4, at 623.
36. All oil and gas leases for the federal outer Continental Shelf lands are awarded
by competitive bidding. 67 Stat. 468 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965). Public lands
subject to oil and gas leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 are leased through
competitive bidding if the lands to be leased are within a known geological structure of
a producing oil or gas field. 41 Stat. 443 (1921), 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (1965). Location,
acreage, and production statistics for competitive oil and gas leases issued by the United
States are found in United States Bureau of Land Management Public Land Statistics
1966, Tables 50 and 54 at 84 and 87 (1966).
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Third, if the tax law results in competitive advantages, but the
tax treatment is for other reasons thought to be in the public interest, then the competitive distortion is the price to be paid for the
countervailing benefits. If the special tax treatment is not otherwise
justifiable, the answer is to change the tax law, not to depart from
competitive leasing.
Fourth, alternatives to competitive leasing would not remove the
handicaps of the smaller firms, and may create other serious
problems.
One alternative is negotiated leasing. That system offers no assurance that the government's compensation will be adequate, or that
the lands will go to the most efficient competitors. Opportunities for
favoritism and discrimination cannot be avoided, and there is no
assurance that the lessees would be other than the largest firms.
A second alternative would be to award each lease to the first applicant, as in the case of wildcat oil and gas leases on public lands.
That system has resulted in the use of a lottery to award leases because of the administrative difficulties raised by the simultaneous
filling of applications." Moreover, if there were advantages of size
or integration, those with the advantages would tend to take up the
wildcat leases by assignments. Thus, the lottery could not overcome
any market imperfections which a competitive system could not
overcome. In addition, a lottery has no propensity to allocate on the
basis of efficiency, or to assure a competitive rate of return to the
United States.
A third alternative is for the Government to go into the business
of producing and marketing shale oil. In analyzing this proposition,
it must be understood that shale oil will have to complete with conventional crude oil in the market place. If the government output
were insufficient to affect the price of competing crude oil, the presence of the Government in the market place would have no effect on
any existing market imperfections. In short, there would be no point
in its presence. On the other hand, if the shale oil output of the
Government were large enough to affect the price of petroleum with
which it competed; if the price of petroleum were at a competitive
level, and if the Government offered its shale oil at less than the
competitive price, others would have to lower their prices and some
who were efficient enough to have existed at competitive price levels
would be driven out of business. In addition, the Government would
be subsidizing oil consumption over consumption of competing
energy sources, thereby misallocating the use of resources.
37. 30 U.S.C.§226(c) (1965).
38. Nugent, Federal Mineral Leasing: .4 Study of Rule-Making and Market Realities, 15 Public Policy 34 (1966).
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On the other hand, if, but for the government marketing operation, prices would have been above competitive levels, and if the
Government were to price its shale oil at what it believed would
have been the competitive level, the ones who would suffer most
would be those who could not survive at competitive price levels. No
misallocation of resources would occur because the consumers would
be paying only the competitive price.
It is far from certain, however, that the Government could work
its will to price at competitive levels. Assuming the absence of effective competition to begin with, who is to say what the competitive
price would have been? An error on the low side would drive out
truly competitive firms and subsidize oil consumption over the consumption of other sources of energy, leading to distortions in other
markets. An error on the high side would protect uneconomic producers, and leave consumers paying above competitive prices, just
as though the facilities were not government-owned.
Even if the Government could divine what the competitive level
would have been, there are reasons to question its will to operate at
that level. Political pressure could be expected from consumer and
producer interests. From time to time the one in ascendancy might
prevail to keep prices lower, or higher, than at competitive levels.
Moreover, the Government would face inherent conflicts of interest.
As an investor in a plant it would tend to want to derive as much
revenue as possible from its investment in shale oil production, but
as a landowner of vast quantities of oil, gas, coal, oil shale, and
uranium lands, producing and potential, with revenues from their
leasing and production, it would feel a responsibility not to price
its shale oil to deprive itself of those other revenues.

39

As adminis-

°

trator of the Oil Import Program it would tend to exclude products which competed with its own, but as a representative of consumers it would tend to ease import restrictions.
In addition, the freedom to correct an erroneous decision would
be seriously impinged once the Government began to market shale
oil. The pressure to continue would be immense and the will to offer
other lands for competing private development would be undermined. The attractiveness of government land for private investment would be reduced. On the other hand, the ability to correct an
error from starting with a competitive leasing test of the market
39. The revenues derived from federal mineral lands are given in United States
Bureau of Land Management Public Land Statistics, pt. 3, at 78-91 (1966).
40. Presidential Proclamation 3279 (March 10, 1959), 73 Stat. C25 (1960) ; 32A
C.F.R. Ch. X (1967).
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would be great. If private monopoly appeared to be developing,
there would still be ample land left to allow for the Government to
produce shale oil for the market, and the antitrust laws would still
be available to dissipate unlawful monopoly.
Finally, if the handicaps to smaller firms are to be overcome,
subsidy within the framework of a competitive leasing system can
be utilized. One method would be to set aside certain tracts for
bidding by smaller firms. Presumably the prices bid would be lower
than the prices which would have been bid by the largest firms-the
difference representing the discount in land values needed to compensate the smaller firms for the disadvantages they faced in competing against the large ones. Whether the land itself would have
sufficient value to account for any such difference is impossible to
predict. The basic question raised-whether the promotion of competition from smaller firms would be worth the land values which
the Government yielded-involves policy questions beyond the scope
of this Article. It must be noted, however, that if a subsidy to
smaller firms were to be provided, the use of competitive bidding
for set-aside tracts has the previously mentioned advantages over
non-competitive methods of resource disposal.
Another possible method of subsidy would be to allow accelerated
depreciation for smaller firms. This could be more attractive to
small businesses than a system of set-asides if the benefit were
greater than that which could be provided in land value discounts.
Like land set-asides, the fast write-off could work within a competitive leasing system.
In sum, the competitive leasing system provides the best opportunity to assure fair returns to the Government and to allocate the
resources to the most efficient of those who could bid for them without subsidy, and to the most efficient of those who could bid for
them only if subsidized.
Having stated, and I hope demonstrated, why a competitive leasing system should be used, the characteristics of a desirable competitive bidding system should be stated.
First, the lease should minimize any opportunity for holding oil
shale lands for speculation. Therefore, the following conditions
should be imposed: (a) Leases should terminate automatically if
minerals are not produced in paying quantities after a designated
period which gives reasonable time for needed exploration, planning, construction, and testing; (b) Leases should provide for high
annual rentals which begin to accrue a few years after the lease is
issued, but which may be credited against royalties accrued during
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the same year; 41 (c) Awards should be made on the basis of cash
bonus bidding. If no cash outlay were required, and royalty bidding
were used, successful lessees might be tempted to delay investment
for a few years, surrender their leases, and try to get new ones at
lower rates.
Second, unnecessary business uncertainties tend to reduce the
number willing to bid and should be avoided. Thus the size of tracts
and the duration of the leases should be specified in advance-the
Department of the Interior's proposed research and development
leasing program offered on May 7, 1967, for public comment has
been much criticized on this account.4 2 Under those proposed regulations the Department of the Interior would issue a number of
leases to applicants who demonstrated the capability to engage in
oil shale research and development. The leases would have two
phases. In Phase I, lasting up to 10 years, the lessee would be required to do research and development work on an amount of acreage the Department decided was sufficient for that purpose. If
during that time the lessee demonstrated to the satisfaction of the
Department that he had developed a commercial process in accordance with the plan he submitted, Phase II of the lease would begin,
to last for so long as minerals were produced in paying quantities.
The acreage for Phase II would also be fixed by the Department at
an amount necessary for commercial production, plus reasonable
reserves. This proposal has been criticized on the grounds that the
lessee would face the uncertainty as to whether (a) he could develop
a process, (b) the process would be satisfactory to the Department
of the Interior, and (c) the process would earn an adequate amount
of land. It has been said that each uncertainty is so great as to make
the investment uneconomic. Whether or not that may be the case, it
is clear that such uncertainties are unnecessary. Leases can be issued
for specified acreages and duration without being tied to the success
of the research and development efforts of the lessee.43 In addition,
if it is thought necessary to make available the technology developed
on leased land, that can be accomplished within the framework of
41. The rental provision for oil shale in the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 241
(1965) is inadequate for this purpose. It stipulates an annual rental of 50 cents per acre.
There are other provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act which deserve a hard look before
that Act is used as the vehicle for oil shale leasing, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1965), which
provides that of the royalty, bonus, rental and other monies received from leasing, 37V2
percent goes to the state which the land is located, 52Y2 percent goes to the Reclamation
Fund, and 10 percent goes to the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury.
42. 32 Fed. Reg. 7086-88 (May 10, 1967).
43. The Department of the Interior no longer advocates the provisional development
leases outlined in the Proposed Regulations of May 7, 1967. The Interior Oil Shale Report
of May 1968 recommends use of competitive leases for commercial development. Interior
Oil Shale Report, supra note 4, at 128-33.
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competitive leasing simply by announcing in advance of lease sales
a requirement that technology developed, and background technology necessary to practice the developed technology, must be licensed to others at reasonable royalty rates. The bidders will know
in advance that they will forego any opportunity for patent monopoly, and can discount their bids accordingly.
Third, the royalty rate base should not magnify the uncertainties
of competitive operation. The royalty base should, therefore, be a
percentage of net income rather than gross income. A rate on gross
income is a cost of doing business, payable irrespective of the rate of
profit. A gross income charge operates to cause production to cease
at the point where the royalty cost, plus other marginal costs, equal
marginal revenue. This point is reached earlier than it would have
been reached if the royalty were not a marginal cost. 44 In view of
the untried nature of oil shale ventures, this added risk of premature termination of production will tend to reduce the number of
bidders and the amounts they are willing to bid.
Fourth, the Government should conduct each sale by either sealed
bid or oral auction bid, depending upon which is likely to be most
effective for the sale in question. Oral auction bidding guarantees
that the winner will not receive the award for less than something
slightly higher than the second highest bidder was willing to drive
him to pay. This is not true of sealed bidding. Under sealed bidding
each competitor estimates not only what he can afford to pay but
what the others are likely to bid. If each bidder underestimates significantly the amount the others would bid, the winning award
could be for less than it would have been if the winner had been required to overcall the next highest bidder at an oral auction. On the
other hand, if there are few bidders (or perhaps only one bidder) at
an oral auction the winner might find his competition weak or nonexistent and get the award at less than he would have estimated it
necessary to bid under a sealed bid. In addition, the business risks
attendant upon collusion are less under sealed bidding. Those participating in the collusion may have no guaranty against an outsider's bid, and must take account of that possibility in deciding on
the price to bid. At oral auction if the conspirators see no outsider
they may take full advantage of their collusive arrangements. Sealed
bidding is therefore more likely than oral auction bidding to reduce
the margin between rigged bid price levels and competitive price
45
levels.
44. Testimony of Professor Walter Mead in Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at
385-86.
45. For an excellent discussion of the question, consult Mead, Natural Resources
DisposalPolicy-OralAuction Versus Sealed Bids, 7 Natural Resources J. 194 (1967).
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Fifth, the requirement that a person, corporation, or association
may hold only one federal lease, 46 and the 5,120-acre limitation on
total holdings of federal land 47 should be eliminated after a substantial number of leases have been issued. This will prevent the
latecomers from having the bidding to themselves.
Sixth, only one lease should be offered at each sale. Multiple offerings at the same time might reduce the vigor of competition for each
tract offered.
Seventh, joint bidding should be prohibited where the joint bidders could have bid independently, because such combines eliminate
the competition between the bidders. Joint bidding by those who
could not bid independently adds bidders and therefore should be
permitted. Since it may be difficult for the Department of the
Interior to determine which bidding combines restrain trade unreasonably and which do not, it could seek the advice of the Depart48

ment of Justice.

CONCLUSION

The absence of a workable and widely available oil shale technology may dictate that the Government engage in research to improve
the technology to enhance the value of its holdings before it offers
them for leasing. Such a government research program would not
preclude private parties from engaging in research on their own
lands at the same time. The government research effort, however,
should be carried no farther than necessary to create a workable
technology and to make it available for practice. If the Government
were to go so far as to engage in commercial shale oil production in
competition with others, it would discourage the development of a
viable oil shale industry and could cause serious market distortions
in the oil industry, in industries which produce other fuels, and in
fuel-consuming industries.
At the time when a workable technology has been developed, the
government oil shale leases should be awarded by competitive bidding. If the oil shale market is not reasonably competitive because
of entry barriers resulting from heavy capital requirements or ver46. 30 U.S.C. § 241 (1965).
47. Id.
48. Donald F. Turner, then Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge
of Antitrust, has indicated that the Department of Justice might participate with the Department of the Interior in the consideration of oil shale research and development consortia. Antitrust Hearings, supra note 4, at 353-54. The Interior Oil Shale Report, supra
note 4, at 133, states that "To the extent joint ventures inhibit competition, they should be
discouraged." The report also suggests consultation with the Deparment of Justice to
develop safeguards to assure competitive bidding.
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tical integration, the setting aside of tracts for bidding by smaller
firms and the offering of tax incentives to smaller firms are devices
which can be used within the competitive system to reduce the
margin of advantage of the more favorably situated firms. Even
if market imperfections cannot be overcome by special assistance to
smaller firms the competitive system should nonetheless be utilized.
Noncompetitive leasing leaves open opportunities for favoritism;
has no propensity to select lessees in accordance with their efficiencies; and offers no assurance that the United States will obtain fair
market value for the resources alienated.

